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Traditional game theoretical models focus on individuals choosing between 
alternatives, even though in many real-life situations, the decision makers are nations, firms, 
or families. It has long been known that we cannot infer group behavior directly from 
individual-level studies (see Davis, 1992 for a review), and groups behave differently from 
individuals with regard to judgmental biases (Kerr, MacCoun and Kramer, 1996; Bottom, 
Ladha and Miller, 2002), cooperation and competition (Insko et al. 1987), risk and 
uncertainty (Charness, Karni and Levin, 2007), trust and trustworthiness (Bornstein, Kugler, 
and Ziegelmeyer, 2004; Kocher and Sutter, 2005), and strategy learning (Sutter, 2005; Kocher 
and Sutter, 2007).  
The current study examines the degree of group cooperation with uncertain 
outcomes, an important but largely ignored topic in both psychology and economics. The 
most related line of research studies a phenomenon labeled “interindividual–intergroup 
discontinuity effect”: interactions between groups are generally more competitive and less 
cooperative than individual interactions in the context of mixed-motive matrix game,1 
usually the prisoner’s dilemma game (for a review, see Wildschut et al., 2003). In the past 
two decades, this interesting individual-group difference with respect to cooperation has been 
well replicated in empirical studies in social psychology and experimental economics. The 
most recent example is Song (2008) in which the author replicates the basic discontinuity 
effect in a trust game and finds people trust less when they make decisions as representatives 
of 3-person groups than when they make decisions for themselves only.  
To our knowledge, no research has been conducted on the degree of group 
cooperation under uncertainty or whether the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect 
                                                        
1  Mixed-motive matrix game is defined as “any game in which the players' preferences among the 
outcomes are partly coincident and partly opposed, motivating the players both to cooperate and to 
compete, as in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.” (Colman, 2001) 
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exists when outcomes are uncertain. There are at least two reasons why we may not be able to 
generalize the discontinuity effect found in deterministic games to a stochastic environment. 
First, previous research has found that groups have a tendency to behave in a more extreme 
manner when outcomes are uncertain than if individuals make choices on their own. This 
phenomenon, known as group risk and cautious shift, or group risk polarization, has been 
studied extensively by social psychologists (Stoner, 1961; See Isenberg, 1986 for a review). 
Depending on the risk attitudes of individual members of the group, groups may make more 
conservative or aggressive decisions than individuals. For a more detailed discussion on the 
general group polarization process, see Isenberg (1986).  
Although most group risk polarization research was conducted by psychologists 
asking subjects’ risk preferences directly, the group risk preference polarization has been 
confirmed by experimental economists inferring subjects’ preference from their decisions 
using monetary incentives. For example, Shupp and Williams (2008) ask both individuals and 
three-person groups to evaluate lottery tickets that have a 10% to 90% of chance of winning 
$20 for individuals and $60 for 3-person groups. They find that “the average group is more 
risk averse than the average individual in high-risk situations, but groups tend to be less risk 
averse in low-risk situations.” This behavior is consistent with group polarization theory, 
since in the same study they also find that individuals are more risk averse in high-risk 
situations than in low-risk situations. Individuals’ risk-aversion tendency in high-risk 
situations and risk-seeking tendency in low-risk situations are enhanced and polarized by the 
group process. Therefore, the average group becomes more risk-averse (risk-seeking) than 
the average individual in high-risk (low-risk) situations.  
If group risk preference polarization can be generalized to a strategic setting under 
uncertainty, such as a stochastic prisoner’s dilemma in which cooperation reduces risks and is 
considered the more risk-averse strategy, we would predict that groups are less cooperative 
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than individuals only if the majority of individual players have a tendency not to cooperate. 
Otherwise, groups may cooperate more than individuals if the majority of individual players 
have a tendency to cooperate. This group polarization prediction partially conflicts with the 
prediction of the discontinuity effect, because if we assume that the discontinuity effect can 
be generalized to scenarios under uncertainty, then we would expect groups to be always less 
cooperative than individuals, independent of how individual members of the group feel about 
cooperating.  
Another reason why we cannot generalize the discontinuity effect from the 
deterministic to a stochastic setting is that previous studies report that individual players learn 
to cooperate more slowly and in general cooperate less in stochastic prisoner’s dilemmas than 
in deterministic prisoner’s dilemmas (Bereby-Meyer and Roth, 2006). In Berger and Hershey 
(1994), subjects are less likely to contribute to a public good when returns are stochastic 
rather than deterministic. Since our focus here is comparing intergroup and interindividual 
differences under uncertainty, the difference in behavior of individual players in the 
stochastic game and deterministic game complicates the comparison. 
To summarize, when uncertainty is introduced into the picture, we cannot simply 
assume that the discontinuity effect still holds and groups are less cooperative than 
individuals.  Our research is a preliminary investigation of how uncertainty affects the 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect.  Specifically, we study group cooperation in 
a two-party game where a party is either an individual or a group and the cooperation of one 
party reduces the risks of both parties.  Mutual cooperation completely removes the risk for 
both parties.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 presents the experimental design and 
procedure. Two games, a deterministic prisoner’s dilemma and a stochastic prisoner’s 
dilemma, were played with individuals and 3-person groups as player types. The study was a 
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2x2 between-subject design [(2 game types) X (2 player types)]. The study results and data 
analysis are reported in Section 2. We found that there was an interaction between the game 
type and the player type: groups are less cooperative than individuals in the deterministic 
game, but more cooperative than individuals in the stochastic game. The effects were 
significant and large. Sections 3 and 4 compare our findings with previous research, and 
provide evidence from survey questionnaires and recorded discussion as to the underlying 
mechanisms of the phenomenon. Three major factors, greed, fear, and persuasion power that 
underlie the usual intergroup competitiveness, were reduced in the stochastic environment. 
Two group mechanisms were proposed to explain group cooperativeness under uncertainty: 
the motivation to avoid guilt and blame when making decisions that affect other’s welfare, 
and the social pressure to conform to certain norms when one is in a group setting. Section 5 
concludes and discusses future extensions. We believe that the findings in the current study 
will serve as a starting point towards integrating three important factors in many social 
dilemmas -uncertainty, cooperation, and group decision, and have prescriptive implications in 
encouraging cooperation to improve social welfare in the real world.  
1. Experimental Design and Procedure 
1.1 The Games 
Two games were played in the current study: one stochastic prisoner’s dilemma 
(SPD) and one deterministic prisoner’s dilemma (DPD).  
The SPD game adopts the structure of the Interdependent Security (IDS) game 
proposed by Kunreuther and Heal (2003) and extends IDS experiments with individuals 
(Kunreuther et al., 2008) to group decision-making. In an IDS game each player decides 
whether or not to invest (incurring an investment cost) to reduce his or her own risk of 
experiencing a larger loss. If one player invests, both players’ risks are reduced, but the 
investor’s risk is reduced more than her counterpart’s. Joint cooperation (both investing) 
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eliminates uncertainty completely and each incurs the investment cost only. As shown in Heal 
and Kunreuther (2007), a variety of problems fit into the interdependent security game 
model, such as airline security, bankruptcy of an entire company caused by a catastrophic loss 
from one of its divisions, etc. The stochastic prisoner’s dilemma (SPD) is a special case of the 
Interdependent Security game. 
The SPD game matrix is shown in Table 1. Negative numbers represent losses. 
Percentages are probabilities of various outcomes in certain decision combinations (cells). 
We used an experimental currency, Taler, with an exchange rate of 1 Taler=2 cents in the 
individual game, and 1 Taler=6 cents in the group game where a group consisted of three 
individuals making a joint decision.2 Subjects were told at the beginning of the experiment 
that their payoffs would be based on a show-up fee ($10) and might also be based on their 
performance in the game.  
[Table 1 about here] 
By removing the uncertainty and substituting the four cells in the SPD game with the 
expected values, we have the corresponding DPD game as shown in Table 2.  The Nash 
equilibrium assuming risk neutrality and using expected values is (Not Invest, Not Invest). 
[Table 2 about here] 
1.2 The Players 
There were two kinds of players: individuals and groups. When two individuals 
played against each other, each person made a decision simultaneously as to whether or not to 
invest. In the group experiment the three subjects within each group made a collective 
decision and shared the final payoffs equally among the group members. Subjects were 
instructed to make unanimous decisions or use a 2 to 1 majority rule to specify their course of 
                                                        
2  The difference in the value of the Talers for the two games was designed to make the payoff 
magnitudes the same for individuals making decisions on their own and for those in 3 person groups.  
 8 
action.3  The personal identities of subjects were never revealed, but all subjects were aware 
as to whether their counterpart was an individual or group. An individual player’s counterpart 
was always another individual while a group player’s counterpart was always another group. 
There were 202 subjects in the study, 88 of whom were male, 105 were female and 9 
subjects did not report their genders. Most subjects were college students. 176 out of 193 
subjects who reported their age were between 19 and 25. 
1.3 The Experimental Design 
The study was conducted in a behavioral lab of a northeastern university using 
Z-tree, a software for developing economic experiments (Fischbacher, 2007). Each individual 
or group used one computer to make their decisions. The computers were placed in two 
connecting rooms and in separate stations surrounded by cardboards to provide anonymity. 
Subjects were approximately 6 feet apart. One group could probably hear other groups 
talking, but it was very unlikely they could tell which one was their counterpart since there 
were usually 24 to 30 people in the two rooms. Most group discussions were recorded with 
the consent of the subjects.4 
Each of the 202 subjects played either a deterministic or a stochastic prisoner’s 
dilemma game, either as members of three-person groups or as individuals. That is, the study 
was a 2X2 between-subject design (2 game types X 2 player types). Table 3 shows the subject 
distribution in the four conditions.  
[Table 3 about here] 
Each player played multiple Supergames in the study. Players played against the 
                                                        
3   Out of the 36 groups who indicated how they made their decisions in the survey 
questionnaires, 32 groups reached unanimous decisions and 4 groups applied majority voting. 
4  We had a mechanical failure in the study which prevented us from recording some group 
discussions. 
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same counterpart in one Supergame (10 rounds), then switched counterparts in the next 
Supergame. At the beginning of each Supergame, players were given 1500 Talers; one Taler 
is exchangeable for 2 cents in the individual condition, and 6 cents in the group condition; 
their wealth from the previous Supergame did not carry over to the current one. All rules, 
such as the number of rounds in a Supergame, the size of a player’s endowment at the start of 
each Supergame, and the fact that one was playing with the same counterpart for one 
Supergame and then switching to another counterpart, were common knowledge. Depending 
on the decision speed and time available for the experiment, players played 5 to 12 
Supergames, with a median of 8 Supergames. That is, each individual/group made 50 to 120 
decisions during the experiment.  
Subjects were told that their final payoffs might depend on one random Supergame 
of theirs before the game began. About 20 percent of the subjects were randomly chosen at 
the end of the experiment and received their actual payoff from one random Supergame. All 
subjects had to answer quiz questions regarding the procedure, game rules, and payment 
determinants before playing the game. Group players were aware at the beginning of the 
experiment that their discussion would be recorded unless they objected. No one objected. All 
subjects answered a survey at the end of the study that included questions regarding their 
strategies, decision rules, risk preferences, self-rated rationality, and demography.  
2. Data Analysis and Results 
2.1 Average Propensity to Cooperate  
Before proceeding with a formal statistical model, we first investigate the data at its 
mean level by assuming the decisions in each round is independent of previous decisions and 
there are no significant differences in cooperation tendency among players. Table 4 shows the 
average cooperation rate (the proportion of times players invested) in each of the four 
conditions. These data are depicted graphically with respect to player type and game type in 
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Figure 1. As one can see there is an interaction effect between player type and game type: 
groups were less cooperative than individuals in the DPD game, but more cooperative than 
individuals in the SPD game.  
[Table 4 about here] 
[Figure 1 about here] 
2.2 The Random Effect Logit Model and Results 
Since subjects made a binomial choice and the 2X2 design was unbalanced, we 
applied a logistic regression model to analyze the interaction, assuming the investment 
decision depends on both the player types and the game types. But a standard logistic 
regression model cannot address two issues in our data.  
First, each subject made repeated decisions in one Supergame (10 rounds) and 
played multiple Supergames. The round order as well as Supergame order may have had an 
effect on the cooperation decisions. Second, each subject made multiple decisions. It is 
unreasonable to assume that the decisions made by the same subject were independent of 
each other because of the heterogeneity of investment propensity among subjects. This 
interdependency among observations, if ignored, will cause one to more easily reject a null 
hypothesis than justified by the data because the estimated variances of coefficients are 
biased downward.  
To account for the above concerns, we applied a random effect logit model with two 
sets of dummy variables. To control for the round and Supergame order effect, we included 
one set of round dummies and one set of Supergame dummies. To address to the second 
concern, subject individual difference, a random effect variable (αi) was included in the logit 
regression as shown in Equation (1). αi varied randomly between subjects and represents the 
deviation of each subject from the general investment propensity. It had a probability 
distribution with expectation zero and variance 2 . Considering the fact that all explanatory 
 11
variables in the logit model are experimental variables, and the study was a complete 
between-subject design, we doubt that there is a correlation between subject-specific effects 
and explanatory variables. Hence the random effect model should be the efficient and 
consistent model that is superior to the fixed effect model. 
Specifically we regressed each decision (1 for Investing, 0 for Not Investing) as the 
dependent variable on the following independent variables: Player Type (group or 
individual), Game Type (DPD or SPD), the interaction of Player Type and Game Type, 
Round numbers and Supergame numbers. Formally, let i index the subject numbers, j index 
the Supergame numbers, and k index the round numbers, Dijk is the binomial decision 
regarding whether or not to invest (cooperate) made by the Subject i in Supergame j, Round 
k. Dijk is 1 if the subject invested and 0 if the subject did not invest. Let pijk be the probability 
that the ith subject invested in Supergame j, Round k. That is, pijk =Pr(Dijk =1). The random 
effect logit model can be written as:  
ijkikj
ijkijkijkijkijkijk
RoundSupergame
SgameGroupSgameGrouppp




54
3210))1/(log(            (1) 
where β0 is the log odds of investing when there are no subject differences and all fixed 
effects are zero; Group ijk is 1 if the decision was made by a group, 0 if made by an 
individual; Sgame ijk is 1 if the decision was a SPD game decision, 0 if it was a DPD game 
decision; Group ijk Sgame ijk is the interaction term between Play Type and Game Type; 
Supergamej is a 12-element-long row vector with the jth element being 1 and all others being 
zeroes; β4 is a 12-element-long column vector representing the fixed effect of each 
Supergame order, 1st, 2nd, …., 12th; Roundk is a 10-element-long row vector with the kth 
element being 1 and all others being zeroes; β5 is a 10-element-long column vector 
representing the fixed effect of each round order, 1st, 2nd, …., 10th; αi is the subject random 
effect distributed ),0( 2N  representing the deviation of each subject from the general 
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investment propensity; ij  are model errors distributed ),0( 2N ; random variables and 
model errors are independent. 
Equation (1) was estimated using the xtlogit package in Stata. Because of the 
existence of the interaction term in the logit model, the interpretation of the coefficients and 
the calculation of the marginal effects are different from the one without the interaction term. 
For example, Group is part of the interaction term, and the marginal effect of Group cannot 
be interpreted as the overall comparison of Group to Individual. Instead, it is the effect of 
Group when the other independent variable in the interaction term, Sgame, is at the reference 
value, i.e. Sgame =0. We found that groups were less cooperative than individuals in the DPD 
game (β1=-3.05, z=-5.9, p<0.01, marginal effect= -0.484). The marginal effect, 48.4%, is the 
probability difference between groups cooperating and individual cooperating in the DPD 
game, not their difference in the study in general. That is, the probability of groups 
cooperating in the DPD game was 48.4% lower than the probability of individuals 
cooperating in the DPD game, which is in line with the literature. 
[Table 5 about here] 
[Table 6 about here] 
Table 5 reports a complete list of estimates. There was a significant interaction 
between Player Type and Game Type (β3=4.97, z=7.92, p<0.01, marginal effect= 0.793). 
Following Ai and Norton (2003), we calculated and reported four probability comparisons in 
Table 6. The comparisons were calculated using the estimates in Table 5. A reversed 
discontinuity effect was found in the SPD game: groups were more cooperative than 
individuals in the SPD game (marginal effect= 0.309). We also found individuals to be less 
cooperative in the SPD game than in the DPD game (β2=-3.51, z=-8.95, p<0.01, marginal 
effect= -0.549), which is consistent with previous research (Bereby-Meyer and Roth, 2006; 
Kunreuther et al., 2008). The opposite was true for the groups: groups were more cooperative 
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in the SPD game than in the DPD game (marginal effect= 0.244).  
Besides the interaction effect, the data also showed an interesting learning process as 
subjects played the game repeatedly. The marginal effects were monotonically decreasing as 
the round number increased, implying that subjects learned not to cooperate over time.  
3. Four Complementary Explanations and Validity Discussion  
The major finding of this paper is a significant interaction between Player Type and 
Game Type. The magnitude of the interaction was large enough to reverse the discontinuity 
effect: groups were more cooperative than individuals in the stochastic game (SPD).  
To better understand the large differences in groups’ cooperation when payoffs are 
known or uncertain, we first provide a brief review of three mechanisms suggested by 
previous research to explain the discontinuity effect in the DPD game and then propose a 
fourth explanation that is complementary to the other three. All four explanations assume no 
uncertainty. We then discuss the how uncertainty may affect the validity of the four 
explanations in the SPD game.  
3.1 Three Mechanisms Underlying the Discontinuity Effect  
After performing a quantitative review of 130 comparisons of interindividual and 
intergroup interactions, Wildschut et al. (2003) summarize three complementary explanations 
for the discontinuity effect in the DPD game: identifiability, social support, and schema-based 
distrust.5 The first two explanations center on greater greed by groups than individuals, and 
the third explanation points to greater fear by groups than individuals.6  
                                                        
5  Wildschut et al. (2003) also identify four moderators of the discontinuity effect: opponent 
strategy, procedural interdependence, communication, and conflict of interest, which are not very 
relevant to this paper because our experimental design made the four moderators the same in all 
treatments. 
6  Following research on cooperation, greed is defined as greed for larger profit by taking 
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According to the identifiability explanation, the anonymity of being in a group 
shields each individual member from social sanctions by the other group members, thus 
encouraging groups to act more competitively and less cooperatively out of greed when the 
other group cooperates (Schopler et al., 1995). The source of greed based on the social 
support explanation is that group members provide mutual reinforcement for the group to 
defect in the name of group interest should the other group decide to cooperate (Insko et al., 
1990).  
According to the fear explanation, groups are less willing to cooperate than 
individuals are because groups have greater fear than individuals that their cooperation will 
not be reciprocated by the other group and that, instead, the other group will take advantage 
of their cooperation by defecting (Insko and Schopler, 1998). This explanation assumes an 
out-group schema of distrust (Sherif et al., 1961), "consisting of learned beliefs and 
expectations that intergroup interactions are aggressive, deceitful, and competitive" 
(Wildschut et al., 2003). That is, foreseeing greater competition between groups than between 
individuals, a group is more likely to suspect that its counterpart group will defect than an 
individual suspects that her counterpart individual will defect. 
3.2 Smart-strategy Persuasion – A Fourth Explanation 
Besides the identifiability, the social support, and the fear explanations, we propose 
a fourth mechanism that helps explain why intergroup interactions were less cooperative than 
interindividual ones. This explanation, which we name smart-strategy persuasion, argues that 
group members can be persuaded by their team members to apply the “smart” strategy which, 
in the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, is defection (Not Invest).  
The smart-strategy persuasion explanation is based on the recorded group 
                                                                                                                                                                            
advantage of the other party’s cooperation, and fear as fear of being exploited by the other party if self 
cooperates. 
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discussions and after-study surveys undertaken in our experiments. In the DPD game, once 
one member figured out that defection was the dominant strategy, it was quite easy for him or 
her to use numbers to persuade other groups that defection was the smart thing to do. This 
process was also reported in subjects’ after-study surveys. For example, when asked how her 
group made decisions, one subject said: “One proposed and explained. We all nodded.” In a 
sense, the deterministic game with certain payoff numbers is a “eureka-type” problem in 
which once certain insight is provides, the truth wins (Cooper and Kagel, 2005). 
Smart-strategy persuasion process greatly improved the group’s chance of discovering and 
following the dominant strategy (Not Invest) relative to an individual operating on his or her 
own.7 Hence groups became less cooperative than individuals.  
Figure 2 summarizes all four explanations underlying the interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity effect observed in the DPD game. The identifiability issue (the difficulty to 
identify individual group members from the group), and social support to maximize total 
profits, encourage groups to be more greedy and defect more than individuals; the fear of 
being taken advantage of by the other group discourages groups from cooperating; and a 
smart-strategy persuasion process enables groups to discover and choose defection as the 
profit-maximization strategy more effectively than individuals. As shown in Figure 2, greed 
and fear coupled with a smart strategy argument decrease groups’ tendency to cooperate and 
jointly function as an explanation of the discontinuity effect in the DPD game. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
3.3 Validity of the Four Explanations in the SPD Game 
The current study found that groups behaved dramatically differently in the DPD 
                                                        
7 Imagine that an average subject has a 1/2 chance to figure out the dominant strategy. If we assume 
that once one member figures it out, the whole group follows her, an average group with 3 subjects 
has 1-(1/2)3 = 7/8 chance to find the dominant strategy.  
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game than in the SPD game. The discontinuity effect in the DPD game was reversed in the 
SPD game. Are the four explanations for the discontinuity effect in the DPD game still valid 
in the SPD game? How does uncertainty influence subjects’ emotion (greed and fear) levels 
and their decision processes? Can one or any combination of the four explanations explain 
the reversed discontinuity effect in the SPD game? In this subsection we will address those 
questions by discussing the validity of each of the four explanations in the SPD game and 
how uncertainty may interfere with the group decision process.  
As shown in Figure 2, the first explanation for the discontinuity effect is 
identifiability. There is no reason that being shielded from social sanctions should be a 
function of whether a game has deterministic or stochastic outcomes. So it is difficult to see 
how this could be the reason for differences in group cooperation in the DPD and SPD 
games.  
The second explanation for the discontinuity effect is the social support explanation: 
group members provide mutual social support for the pursuit of self-interest in the name of 
group interest. This social-supported-greed explanation seemed reasonable in the DPD game 
in which defection obviously maximized the group profit, but was questionable in the SPD 
game because expected-profit maximization might not be in the best interest of the group 
when uncertainty is present. Although defection in the SPD game had a higher expected value 
than cooperation for the party making the decision, defection also had a higher variance. This 
uncertainty could be reduced by investing and would be completely removed if both players 
invested. Some group members might have thus considered cooperation to be in the interest 
of the group because it was a “safer” strategy than defection. 
This possibility is supported by evidence from recorded discussions and survey 
questionnaires. We successfully recorded 14 groups in the DPD game and 30 groups in the 
SPD game. 13 out of these 14 groups in the DPD game always accepted the proposal 
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whenever a group member suggested defection for higher profits when compared to 
cooperation. In the SPD game, however, 11 out of these 30 groups rejected a member’s 
defection suggestion at least once, several groups rejecting this idea multiple times. 
Interestingly 59% of the rejections were based on risk preference differentials, such as “I 
prefer a safer bet and cooperate.” or “The probability of loss looks too high to me if we 
defect.” Results from the post-study survey questionnaire indicate that there existed a positive 
correlation between subjects’ risk-averse propensity and their influence on the group 
decisions.8 Those who were more concerned about risks had a greater influence on the group 
decisions (t(157)=2.20, p=0.03), which often led to cooperative behavior. 
Turning to the third explanation, the schema-based distrust, or fear, the source of this 
concern in the DPD game was from the “expectation” that the other group would defect and 
exploit a decision on our part to cooperate. In the SPD game, it is possible that the 
schema-based fear was reduced because group members observed reduced social-supported 
greed of their own group (as discussed above) and inferred less greed from the other group as 
well (Dawes and Thaler, 1988). Thus groups expected less competitiveness from the other 
group than in the DPD game. That is, Group A would be less afraid of being taken advantage 
of by Group B if Group A cooperated in the SPD game than in the DPD game. The reason for 
this reduced concern is because Group A itself is less likely to take advantage Group B if 
Group B cooperates in the SPD game than in the DPD game. 
To test the above possibility of reduced fear in the SPD game, we counted the 
frequencies of groups expressing explicit or implicit fear (to be exploited by the other group), 
such as “I do not trust them”, or “what if they defect?”, etc. The absolute frequencies of fear 
                                                        
8  Data are from another study in which subjects played the same game as the current one except 
that the investment was 36 instead of 45. Subjects in that study were from the same subject pool as the 
current study. 
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expressions in the DPD or SPD game were not significantly different (t(42)=0.62, p=0.54). 
But considering the fact that subjects talked considerably more in the SPD game than in the 
DPD game,9 the relative frequency of fear expressions or the salience of fear in the SPD 
game was probably lower than in the DPD game. This is consistent with our theory that the 
fear underlying the discontinuity effect was modified and less salient in the SPD game. 
Regarding the validity of the fourth explanation under uncertainty, we believe that 
smart-strategy persuasion had less influence in pushing groups to defect in the SPD game 
than in the DPD game for three reasons. First, in the SPD game, the probabilities associated 
with different payoffs made it more difficult to determine the smart strategy. Data compiled 
from recorded group discussion indicate that only 17% of the groups in the SPD game had at 
least one member who discovered the dominant strategy (defection), while 50% of the groups 
in the DPD game had at least one member who knew that defection was the game theoretic 
strategy to follow. Second, in the SPD game, even if one member successfully identified 
defection as the smart strategy, it was harder to persuade other members that this was the 
appropriate action to take given the complexity of probabilities, outcomes and expected-value 
calculations required in the SPD game that were absent in the DPD game with certain and 
clear-cut payoffs. Third, even after the smart member convinced the whole group that 
defection was the rational strategy with higher expected payoff, the group might still refuse to 
apply the “smart” strategy because it was unclear that being smart and defection was in the 
best interest of the group because of risk preference differentials among group members. 
Some members might prefer a safer strategy (cooperation) with lower expected payoffs than 
a riskier strategy (defection) with higher expected payoffs.  
In summary, we argue that three out of four mechanisms underlying the 
discontinuity effect in the DPD game were affected by uncertainty in the SPD game. As 
                                                        
9  This is an observation we made while listening to the tapes, not quantitative data.  
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summarized in Figure 3, the three arguments in the DPD game shown in Figure 2 are circled 
by dotted-lines because they are mitigated by the uncertainty in the SPD game. Those 
mitigated reasons then cause reduced greed, fear, and persuasion power, which explains why 
the discontinuity effect disappeared in the SPD game. However, the reversed discontinuity 
effect remains a puzzle. There is no evidence or reason why groups would have less greed or 
fear, or the persuasion process would make groups less smart (in terms of identifying the 
smart strategy) than individuals. Then why were groups more cooperative than individuals in 
the SPD game? This question will be the focus of the next section. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
4. Two Group Processes Underlying the Reversed Discontinuity Effect 
In this section, we propose two complementary explanations for the reversed 
discontinuity effect in the SPD game. We argue that groups were more cooperative than 
individuals in the SPD game for two reasons: an aversion to guilt and the motivation to avoid 
blame when making decisions that affect the welfare of others (Charness and Dufwenberg, 
2006; Charness and Jackson, 2009), and the social pressure to conform to certain norms when 
in a group and observed by others (see Turner, 1991 for a review on social conformity). 
4.1 Guilt Aversion and Blame Avoidance under Uncertainty 
The first explanation is based on how group members perceive responsibility when 
making decisions with collective outcomes. It has been known that people suffer from guilt if 
they inflict harm on others (Baumeister et al., 1994). The term, guilt aversion, is adopted 
from Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) where they define a guilt-averse player as someone 
who “suffers from guilt to the extent he believes he hurts others relative to what they believe 
they will get.” They find that, in a trust game, people try to live up to others’ expectations to 
avoid guilt. In a more recent paper, Charness and Jackson (2009) find that, in a Stag Hunt 
game, one third of the subjects are sensitive to the responsibility issue and make different 
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decisions whether or not their actions impact on another person’s outcome. More specifically, 
90% of those responsibility-sensitive subjects take on more risk when choosing only for 
themselves only than when choosing for both themselves and a silent partner. In that paper, 
the risky choice is the one with which the player either gets a high (9) or low (1) payoff 
depending on the other player’s choice, while the safe choice is the one that gets the fixed 
payoff (8) no matter what the other player chooses. The authors argue that one of the reasons 
for opting for the safe option is to avoid blame, which is related to the notion of guilt 
aversion.   
Similar reasoning can be applied to the group decision process in the SPD game. 
Imagine that a smart group member in the SPD game figured out that defection had a higher 
expected payoff for the group. But she was also aware of the higher probability of suffering a 
loss associated with defection than with cooperation. Similar to players in the Stag Hunt 
game in Charness and Jackson (2009) even if she believed that defection was the rational 
strategy and she by herself was willing to take the risk for the sake of higher expected payoff, 
she might be reluctant to suggest that the group defect, because the person would foresee the 
ex post guilt she would feel and the ex post blame she would get from other members, if the 
group followed her suggestion to defect and a large loss occurred. When all group members 
engage in such a safety-first adjustment process, the group becomes more conservative and 
less willing to take on risks than when individuals act on their own. Hence more groups than 
individuals opted for cooperation to reduce risks in the SPD game. Note that here we argue 
that guilt aversion and blame avoidance are two different motivations associated with the 
same risk-reduction action.  
4.2 Social Pressure to be Pro-group, Smart, and Nice 
The second mechanism underlying group cooperativeness (reversed discontinuity 
effect) in the SPD game has to do with the conformity process in groups (see Turner, 1991 for 
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a review). That is, a group member feels social pressure from other members to conform to 
certain norms. Under a strategic setting, such as in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, three norms are 
especially relevant for a group member whose behavior is observed by other members: the 
norm of being pro-group, the norm of being smart, and the norm of being nice.  
The norm of being pro-group arises from the in-group favoritism existing in even 
temporary and meaningless group categories (Tajfel, 1982). For example, in one study, Tajfel 
and his colleges grouped British schoolboys solely on whether they over- or underestimate 
the number of dots on a slide, which hardly had any meaning to either group. However, later 
in the experiment the boys tended to allocate more money to those in their own group than 
those in the other group. In a PD game, in-group favoritism is manifested in striving for the 
best interest of the group (Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 1994; Baron, 2001). 
The being-smart norm states that in a strategic setting with conflicting interests, one 
should struggle for good outcomes and avoid being a sucker. Previous research has found that 
people are averse to playing the sucker so that others can and let others free ride (Orbell and 
Dawes, 1981). Fear of being a sucker plays an important role in people’s cooperation 
decisions in social dilemmas (Rapoport and Eshed-Levy, 1989). One feature of being smart is 
not being a sucker and thus being taken advantage of by the other party. In the case of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, this implies defection because of a fear that the other party will defect. 
Another feather of being smart in the Prisoner’s Dilemma indicates following one’s own 
interest, which also implies defection because one is better off by defecting than by 
cooperating, independent of the other party’s decision. 
The norm of being nice indicates a desire to cooperate with others. For example, 
people may cooperate in social dilemmas because “they are not the kind of people who 
benefit at the expense of others” (Dawes 1980). Note that the niceness norm implies another 
form of guilt aversion: people may feel guilty when their action (Not Investing) harms the 
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other group, especially when they cannot adequately justify themselves, as will be discussed 
below. The motivation of being nice when one’s behavior is observed by group members may 
drive people to choose cooperation over defection, because in a PD game both parties 
cooperating leads to better outcomes than both parties defecting, and cooperation is regarded 
as socially desirable behavior. 
In the DPD game, both the pro-group norm and the smartness norm implied 
defection since the group was always better off defecting than cooperating regardless of the 
other group’s decision. As discussed before, inflated greed and fear, together with 
smart-strategy persuasion, reinforced the defection strategy as the smart strategy that 
maximizes group profits and is in the best interest of group (as well as individuals). The 
niceness strategy of cooperation was clouded by being pro-group and being smart. Hence we 
observed the discontinuity effect in the DPD game that groups were less cooperative than 
individuals.  
In the SPD game, however, the salience and importance of norms was changed by 
the uncertainty. As summarized in Figure 3, it was ambiguous as to whether defection was 
really in the best interest of the group when uncertainty was present, and it was harder for the 
group to identify and agree on defection as being the smart strategy in the SPD game. As a 
result, being pro-group and being smart became less obvious, and being nice became more 
salient in the SPD game than in the DPD game.  In other words, when defection could not 
be justified by being pro-group and being smart, more weight was put on being nice and not 
to cause harm to the other party, thus encouraging cooperation as socially desirable. When 
one is in a group, there is social pressure to conform to social norms and perform social 
desirable behaviors, especially when one’s behavior is observable by other members in the 
group (Turner, 1991). Thus, in the SPD game, group member were more likely to conform to 
the niceness norm and choose the socially desirable strategy (cooperation) than individuals. 
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Hence a reversed discontinuity effect was observed in the SPD game.  
5. Conclusions and General Discussions 
Previous research has shown a ‘discontinuity effect’: groups are less cooperative 
than individuals (Insko et al., 1987; Wildschut, et al., 2003). We replicated the discontinuity 
effect in the DPD game, but found a reversed discontinuity effect when uncertainty existed: 
groups were more cooperative than individuals in the SPD game.  We suggest the three 
major factors that underlie the usual discontinuity effect, greed, fear, and persuasion power, 
were reduced in the stochastic environment. Two complementary explanations for the 
reversed discontinuity effect in the SPD game were proposed: guilt-aversion tendency and 
blame-avoidance motivation when making decisions that affect others’ welfare, and the social 
pressure to conform to the niceness norm when it was unclear what strategy was pro-group 
and smart. 
As a summary, Table 7 illustrates all decision mechanisms discussed in this paper 
and provides a general framework for explaining both the discontinuity effect in the DPD 
game and the reversed discontinuity effect in the SPD game.  
In the DPD game, it is fairly easy to identify defection as the pro-group and smart 
strategy. The greater greed and fear in groups, as shown by previous research, and the 
persuasion argument we proposed, encourage groups to defect by following a smart strategy 
and behaving with the best interest of the group in mind. Hence groups defect more than 
individuals and the discontinuity effect is observed. 
In the SPD game, however, uncertainty influences group preferences through two 
mechanisms: role of responsibility and conformity pressure. Guilt-aversion and 
blame-avoidance cause groups to opt for the safer strategy (cooperation) when facing 
uncertain outcomes. The existence of uncertainty complicates the game, and makes it harder 
to identify defection as the pro-group and smart strategy. The norm of being nice, which was 
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clouded by the norm of being pro-group and smart in the DPD game, becomes more salient in 
the SPD game where the pro-group and smart norm no longer play a central role. With the 
social pressure to conform to the niceness norm, groups become more cooperative than 
individuals under uncertainty, and a reversed discontinuity effect is observed in the SPD 
game. 
[Table 7 about here]  
The discontinuity effect appears to cast doubt on the efficiency of group decisions to 
cooperate, but the reversed discontinuity effect under uncertainty rekindles hope of groups 
making cooperative decisions in the interest of social welfare since most scenarios in the real 
world are probabilistic ones. This finding has implications for many social dilemma 
problems. We may actually be able to use uncertainty to improve intergroup cooperation. For 
example, when two groups face a social dilemma problem, a regulator or a mediator can 
emphasize the probabilistic nature of the outcomes as a means of reducing group greed and 
fear associated with defection, while at the same time activating guilt-aversion and 
blame-avoidance to encourage cooperation. In another scenario where the uncertainty is 
obvious and people make individual decisions, one may be able to encourage cooperation by 
categorizing people into groups with common interests.  
Before carrying out any application of the group cooperation under uncertainty in 
the field, there are questions that warrant further investigation. First, the two mechanisms we 
propose in the paper to explain the inter-group cooperation or the reversed discontinuity 
effect are based on previous literature rather than empirical studies. That is, the current data 
are not sufficient to either verify or refute these two mechanisms. Is either one or both of 
them necessary for the existence of group cooperativeness under uncertainty? Will one of 
them be sufficient to initiate the reversed discontinuity effect? Are there other group 
mechanisms that are underlying the group cooperation under uncertainty besides those 
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discussed here? These are all important questions to be answered in order to fully understand 
the phenomenon.  
Second, the generality of the reversed discontinuity effect in the SPD game remains 
open to discussion. For example, the current study uses a security game with negative 
outcomes to mimic real-world scenario in which players invest to reduce the risks of 
suffering a loss. What if it is an investment game with positive outcomes? Researchers have 
found that people encode losses and gains differently (Seymour et al., 2007) and typically 
show greater sensitivity to loss than to gain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The 
guilt-aversion and blame-avoidance motivations underlying the reversed discontinuity effect 
may be stronger in a loss-domain game than in a gain-domain game. If a loss occurred, the 
regret from not investing in risk-reducing measures is likely to be larger than if additional 
revenue could have been earned from investing in a profit-enhancing measure in a 
gain-domain game. That is, groups may be more loss averse than individuals. It will be 
interesting to test whether there is a triple interaction between the loss/gain domain, the 
group/individual player type, and the DPD/SPD game type. In fact, this triple interaction is 
confirmed in one of the follow-up studies the authors are conducting. Preliminary results 
show that groups cooperated more than individuals in SPD games with both positive and 
negative payoffs, but the group-individual cooperation difference is bigger in the game with 
negative payoffs than in the one with positive payoffs.  
Aside from loss domain, there are at least two additional categories of factors that 
are relevant to the generality issue of the group cooperation under uncertainty phenomenon: 
factors that change group structure or the decision rules, and factors that alter the game 
context or structure. The group factors include leadership, voting mechanism, within-group 
interest conflict, etc. The game factors include, but are not exclusive to, length of the game 
(one shot vs. repeated), between-player communication, partial/full feedback system, nature 
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of uncertainty, type of games (PD game or other games), multiple-player game, etc.  
To conclude, we believe that the findings in the current study will serve as a starting 
point towards integrating three important factors in many social dilemmas -uncertainty, 
cooperation, and group decision. Further investigation of these questions will provide 
possible applications for regulators and organizations to control risks, encourage group 
cooperation, and improve social welfare.  
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Table 1: Possible outcomes in the SPD game 
 Player 2 
Invest Not Invest 
Player 1 
Invest -45; -45 20% lose 145,80% lose 45;  
40% lose 100,60% lose 0   
Not Invest 40% lose 100,60% lose 0; 
20% lose 145,80% lose 45 
52% lose 100,48% lose 0; 
52% lose 100,48% lose 0 
 
 
Table 2: Possible outcomes in the DPD game 
 Player 2 
Invest Not Invest
Player 1
Invest -45;- 45 -65;- 40   
Not Invest -40;- 65 -52;- 52 
 
 
Table 3: Subject distribution in the four conditions 
 Individual Player Group Player 
# of Subjects # of Decisions # of Subjects/# of Groups # of Decisions 
DPD 22 2400 48/16 1440 
SPD 42 3100 90/30 2080 
 
Table 4: Cooperation rates in the four conditions 
 Group 
Player 
Individual 
Player 
DPD 32% 78%
SPD 52% 22% 
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 Table 5. Estimates of logit model for cooperation probability 
 
Variable Mean Coefficient Standard Error z value Pr(>|z|) Marginal Effects 
(dy/dx)* 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Cooperation 0.458      
Independent 
Variables 
 
Constant  2.839 0.342 8.30 0.000 0.343  
Sgame 0.574 -3.513 0.401 -8.77 0.000 -0.549 
Group 0.390 -3.051 0.521 -5.86 0.000 -0.484 
Fixed Effects  
Round2 0.100 -0.341 0.123 -2.76 0.006 -0.050 
Round3 0.100 -0.378 0.123 -3.07 0.002 -0.055 
Round4 0.100 -0.503 0.123 -4.09 0.000 -0.073 
Round5 0.100 -0.633 0.123 -5.16 0.000 -0.092 
Round6 0.100 -0.741 0.123 -6.04 0.000 -0.107 
Round7 0.100 -0.877 0.123 -7.15 0.000 -0.127 
Round8 0.100 -1.185 0.123 -9.62 0.000 -0.169 
Round9 0.100 -1.935 0.127 -15.22 0.000 -0.268 
Round10 0.100 -3.064 0.142 -21.63 0.000 -0.388 
Supergame2 0.120 -0.594 0.113 -5.26 0.000 -0.087 
Supergame3 0.120 0.013 0.112 0.11 0.911 0.002 
Supergame4 0.120 -0.163 0.112 -1.46 0.145 -0.024 
Supergame5 0.120 -0.765 0.117 -6.53 0.000 -0.112 
Supergame6 0.111 -0.320 0.122 -2.62 0.009 -0.047 
Supergame7 0.095 -0.411 0.122 -3.36 0.001 -0.060 
Supergame8 0.095 0.081 0.135 0.60 0.548 0.012 
Supergame9 0.071 -0.176 0.140 -1.26 0.208 -0.026 
Supergame10 0.062 -0.115 0.167 -0.69 0.491 -0.017 
Supergame11 0.038 -0.289 0.190 -1.52 0.128 -0.042 
Supergame12 0.024 -0.528 0.187 -2.82 0.005 -0.077 
Interaction Term  
Sgame*Group 0.224 4.973 0.638 7.800 0.000 0.793 
Rho  0.396 0.041  
Log likelihood -4169.8 
Sample size 9020 
Notes: * Because the independent variables are binary, we calculated discrete changes of dummy variables from 0 to 1 
following Long (1997). Please refer to Table 6 for the interpretations of the marginal effects of variables in the interaction 
term. 
 
 
Table 6: Cooperation probability comparison (marginal effects) 
 
 Marginal Effects Interpretation 
Game 
Type 
DPD Group-Individual Difference -0.484 
Groups are 48.4% less likely to cooperate 
than individuals in the DPD game 
SPD Group-Individual Difference 0.309 
Groups are 30.9% more likely to 
cooperate than individuals in the SPD 
game
Player 
Type 
Group SPD-DPD Difference 0.244 
individuals are 24.4% more likely to 
cooperate in the SPD game than in the 
DPD game 
Individual SPD-DPD Difference -0.549 
individuals are 54.9% less likely to 
cooperate in the SPD game than in the 
DPD game 
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Table 7:  A summary of group cooperation in the DPD and SPD game 
 Game Types 
DPD Game SPD Game 
Effect of No 
Uncertainty 
Effect on 
Cooperation 
Group- 
Individual 
Difference 
Effect of  
Uncertainty 
Effect on 
Cooperation 
Group- 
Individual 
Difference 
G
ro
up
 P
ro
ce
ss
es
 
R
ol
e 
of
 
R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 Guilt 
Aversion 
No ex post guilt 
from uncertain 
outcome 
(Section 4.1) 
 
D
isc
on
tin
ui
ty
 E
ffe
ct
 
Foreseeing ex post 
guiltsafer strategy 
(cooperation) 
(Section 4.1) 
Increase 
 R
ev
er
se
d 
D
isc
on
tin
ui
ty
 E
ffe
ct
. 
Blame 
Avoidance 
No ex post blame 
from uncertain 
outcome 
(Section 4.1) 
 
Foreseeing ex post 
blamesafer 
strategy(cooperation)
(Section 4.1) 
Increase 
Unclear 
what the pro-group 
strategy is 
(Section 3.3)
 
C
on
fo
rm
ity
 P
re
ss
ur
e 
Pro-group 
Pro-group strategy 
(defection) is 
reinforced by 
greater greed and 
fear(Section 3.1) 
 
Decrease Hard to figure out 
and convince other 
members what the 
smart strategy is 
(Section 3.3)
 
Smart 
Smart strategy 
(defection) is 
reinforced by 
smart-strategy 
persuasion 
(Section 3.2) 
Decrease Niceness is more 
salient than being 
pro-group and 
being smart;  
Social pressure 
pushes groups to be 
more cooperative 
than individuals 
(Section 4.2) 
Increase 
Nice 
Nice strategy 
(cooperation) is 
clouded by being 
pro-group and 
being smart 
(Section 4.2) 
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Figure 1: Player Type and Game Type Interaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
 
Figure 2: Four Complementary Explanations for the Discontinuity Effect in the DPD 
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Figure 3: The Disappearance of the Discontinuity Effect in the SPD 
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